Abstract. We propose a protocol for anonymous distribution of quantum information which can be used in two modifications. In the first modification the receiver of the message is publicly known, but the sender remains unknown (even to receiver). In the second modification the sender is known, but the receiver is unknown (even to sender). Our protocol achieves this goal with unconditional security using classical anonymous message transfer proposed by Chaum as a subprotocol.
Introduction
The anonymous transmission of classical information [1, 2, 3, 4 ] is a standard and important part of classical cryptography which was originally designed to hide communication traffic, i.e. to keep secret even the fact that there is some communication. It turned out that this primitive allows to implement a number of extremely important cryptographic primitives such as digital pseudosignatures [5] , Byzantine agreement [6] or secure ballot elections [7] .
In this paper we propose a protocol which realizes anonymous transfer of quantum information. In [8] authors independently designed a protocol, which shares two design elements -anonymous entanglement and distribution of the state 1 √ 2 (|0 n + |1 n ). In this paragraph we will briefly discuss the results of this paper. Firstly, we would like to note that Protocol 1 of [8] for anonymous transmission of classical information does not achieve anonymity of the receiver -it simply achieves broadcast, i.e. everyone is the receiver and the message is known to each participant. Protocol 2 of [8] is supposed to realize anonymous transfer of quantum information. However, as obvious from Step 6 of the protocol, it is supposed that receiver knows identity of the sender. Provided that both sender and receiver should remain secret to other participants, the distribution of the state 1 √ 2 (|0 n + |1 n ) is nontrivial, since the distributor of this state can determine identity of sender and received with high probability (depending on the method of distribution). Unfortunately, from the paper [8] it is not completely obvious what anonymous entanglement means (especially in context of Step 6 in Protocol 2). We conclude that authors in Protocol 2 either partially solved problem different from the original one proposed by Chaum [1] , or their protocol is insecure. Let us briefly review definition of the anonymous transfer. There is a number of different modifications of anonymous transmission of (classical) information, we will consider primarily the following version: There are n potential senders and one publicly known receiver (R). One of the senders (S) wants to send a message mes to R in the way that the following conditions hold simultaneously:
-R learns the message mes.
-No one except S and R learns the message mes.
-No one can determine who is the sender S.
-If someone is disrupting 1 the protocol, he will be detected with good probability (in this case the message is not transferred and the identity of S might be compromised).
We will denote it as message transmission with anonymous sender -MTAS. This problem is solvable in the classical case with unconditional security [1] . In the same paper Chaum solved also a modification of this problem. The requirements are the same as in the previous case except that the sender is publicly known and the receiver is unknown. We will denote this primitive as message transmission with anonymous receiver -MTAR. Both these primitives will be used in our protocol.
In this paper we propose anonymous transmission of quantum information with security properties equivalent to the protocol [1] . To justify the design of the protocol we will describe first in Section 3 slightly less secure, but more understandable, solution. The problem of the first version of the protocol is that the only person who can detect disrupters is the receiver, but he cannot prove to other participants that particular party was cheating. There are two possible consequences of this fact. First possible solution is that the receiver does not check for disruption -in this case disruptors remain undetected and unpunished. The other possibility is that the receiver is trusted from this point of view. The disadvantage is that he can accuse honest participant from cheating and thus exclude him from the protocol.
Presently we are preparing full version of this paper, which will explain the proposed protocol in more detail.
Participants and Cheaters
There are n + 1 participants: n potential senders P = {P i } n i=1 , one (secret) real sender S ∈ P and one publicly known receiver R. The anonymity is assured, as in the classical solution, by the fact that there are n potential senders cooperating in the way that no one knows who really sent the message (except the sender itself). This solution is possible as long as there is at least one honest potential sender in addition to the sender S.
The sender S is the completely trusted participant in this problem -he has no cheating objectives. R is partly trusted -he is not interested in disruption of the protocol with one exception -he might be interested to disrupt the protocol provided that he can accuse one of the participants from disrupting the protocol and exclude him from the next executions of the protocol. This is precisely the problem not solved by the version of the protocol presented in Section 3. R also does not have to cheat in order to learn the message -he will learn it anyway. His main goal remains to learn the identity of the sender S. Other participants -potential senders -might be interested in a number of objectives -they want to learn the identity of S, they want to learn the message mes and they want to disrupt the protocol. We also have to consider the possibility that all cheating participants will completely cooperate. The protocol we propose in Section 4 is secure even in this case provided that there is at least one honest potential sender besides S.
Framework of the Design and Simplified Protocol
The first idea of the proposed protocol is that S can easily transfer any quantum state anonymously to R provided that S and R share an EPR pair with property that R does not know who is possessing the other system of the EPR pair 2 . To transfer the stateρ S simply teleports it using the EPR pair to R and sends him the result of the measurement using MTAS.
Therefore to implement anonymous transmission of quantum information we design protocol achieving anonymous sharing of an EPR pair. The protocol 'Anonymous EPR pair distribution' (Protocol 2) achieves that at the end S and R share anonymously a number of EPR pairs with the exception that certain fraction of them might be noisy (e.g. impure, eavesdropped). In order to solve this problem they use entanglement purity testing codes, which mapm noisy EPR pairs to m pure EPR pairs. The parameters m andm should be chosen (as well as a particular family of purity testing codes) according to expected level of noise. This technique is analogical to the one used in authentication of quantum information [9] . Complete protocol with purity testing and teleportation is described in Protocol 1.
Purity testing proposed in Section 4 is slightly different and will be discussed later.
Protocol 1: Anonymous quantum channel -simplified version Parties: S ∈ {Pi} n i=1 , R 1: All participants agree on a set of quantum purity testing codes {Q k } k that mapm qubits to m qubits. This part can be precomputed, public and non-anonymous. 2: Repeat anonymous EPR pair distribution a number of times (runm actual rounds). 3: S chooses purity testing code and sends k to R using MTAS. 4: R measures syndrome of code Q k and sends the result to all potential senders (and therefore also to S). 5: S measures syndrome of code Q k and compares it with the syndrome received from R. If both syndromes are the same, S and R share with high probability m EPR pairs. 6: S teleports the messageρ using the shared EPR pairs to R. S sends outcomes of the Bell measurements to R using MTAS.
In the rest of this section we will describe simplified implementation of the anonymous EPR pair distribution, see Protocol 2. In this protocol we use trap rounds in order to detect potential disruptors and cheaters.
In order to keep anonymity of S, all quantum communication with potential senders is performed by R (note that S can use classical anonymous communication). In Step 4 R creates n + 1 qubit state and distributes it in the way that each participant of the protocol holds one qubit. A specific property of the state he creates is that after each potential sender (except S) measures his share in the basis 3 {|+ , |− }, the state of the quantum systems controlled by S and R collapses either to
, depending on outcomes of measurements, where [σ z ] S denotes application of the Paulî σ z operator on the system controlled by S. In Step 5 all participants measure their systems in the basis {|+ , |− } and thus cause the collapse described above. They send results of their measurements to S in Step 8 and using these results S repairs the state to
Step 11. The trap rounds are introduced in order to prevent cheating of potential senders. There are two basic ways how potential sender can cheat.
-Potential sender does not measure the system he received in the basis {|+ , |− } and instead he performs some general quantum operation on this system. -Potential sender is lying about his outcome o i .
Obviously the second case does not help the cheater much, it causes only disruption and can be easily detected in the trap round (see below). In the first case he cannot be sure about the state he obtained in the trap round and with nonzero probability his answer o i is incorrect. Cheaters still have a chance to remain undetected provided they do not cheat in a significant number of rounds (or their Protocol 2: Anonymous EPR pair distribution -simplified version Parties: S ∈ {Pi} n i=1 , R 1: S decides whether this round will be a trap round or an actual round. 2: S announces his decision to R using MTAS. 3: If trap round: R sends to each potential sender Pi quantum system randomly in the state |+ or |− and remembers the state he sent. 4: If actual round: R prepares (n + 1) qubit system in the state
) and sends one qubit to each potential sender Pi (he keeps the last qubit). 5: Each potential sender Pi (except S) measures the received system in the basis {|+ , |− } and records the outcome oi. 6: If trap round: S measures the received system in the basis {|+ , |− } and records the outcome oi. 7: If actual: S keeps the received system unmeasured. 8: All {Pi}i anonymously agree on the order (using anonymous ordering a ) and each of them sends his oi to S using MTAR. operation gives classical output close to measurement in basis {|+ , |− }). The advantage they get in this way is ruled out by the purity testing codes used in the main protocol. The purpose of trap rounds is to detect potential incorrect manipulation with received quantum systems. It is important to observe that the values o i are sent to R only in case of the trap round. In this case also S measures his system and therefore his output is undistinguishable from outputs of other participants. In the actual round S keeps the values and R does not receive them. It is important, because otherwise he would be able to detect who is the sender 4 . The problem of this protocol is that only the receiver learns who is the cheater and he cannot prove it to other participants. Receiver might be interested in accusing honest participant from cheating in order to exclude him from next executions of the protocol.
The Protocol
In order to solve the problem with detection of cheaters we will modify both the main protocol and the anonymous EPR distribution.
The basic idea of the modified anonymous EPR distribution (see Protocol 3) is different than in the previous version. In this case quantum systems are distributed by the sender S. In order to keep his identity secret we require that each of the potential senders distributes in Step 2 identical state |φ . After this step all participants share n quantum systems in state |φ . In Step 6 each potential sender (except S) measures his system in basis {|+ , |− } and each of n shared states collapses to EPR pair (up to localσ z operation on the qubit controlled by S) shared by S and R. In Step 8 S repairs all states to EPR pairs. It is important to mention that both S and R know (and record) the creator of each particular EPR pair, i.e. the participant who created and distributed the original system in state |φ . This is important (as explained in detail in following paragraphs), because the creator of the state is the primary suspect disruptor of the corresponding EPR pair.
The detection of cheaters is done again using trap rounds. In this case trap round is executed by S. Analogically to the behavior of R in the previous version S sends either |+ or |− to each of the participants. The participants have no idea which of the shared states was generated by S and therefore there is a nonzero chance to cheat with the trap state and get caught. If S detects a cheater in Step 7, he announces his identity to each participant using MTAS.
There is one specific way potential senders can try to cheat. Each sender can be sure that the state he created and distributed is not the trap state and therefore he does not measure it. In this way there can be a significant noise in each round. Considering the extreme case that there is only one honest potential sender besides S, we obtain that there will be only 2 EPR pairs comparing to n−2 noisy states in each execution of the anonymous EPR distribution. Obviously such amount of noise is hard to exclude and purify. Surprisingly, we can solve this problem in the main protocol, see Protocol 4. However, it is important to remember for each particular state who was creator of the state.
To complete description of our solution we will describe the main protocol, see Protocol 4. Basic idea is the same as in Protocol 1 except that we perform the test for correctness of shared EPR pair independently for ensembles created by different participants. This is because significant number of cheaters can introduce uncorrectable amount of noise and disrupt the protocol without being caught. The purity testing performed independently for each ensemble ensures that EPR pairs created by honest participants are not affected by the noise introduced by cheaters. Cheaters therefore only reduce efficiency.
Since the noise could have been also introduced by R, we do not exclude creators of noisy ensembles from next execution of the protocol. The number of correct ensembles is the same as the number of honest potential sender and therefore anonymity is not reduced. If the ensemble created by S is noisy it is clear that R is cheating, however, it is better to take no countermeasures (not to complain), because R can use it to reveal identity of S (with small, but still dangerous, probability).
In case S is supposed to complain when R introduces noise into ensemble created by S, R might try to determine identity of S in the way that he randomly introduces noise to EPR pairs created by honest participants. If S does not complain, it means that the modified ensembles were not created by S. In case all malicious participants cooperate with R, he has chance 1/h to detect S, where h is the number of honest paticipants. On the other hand, when S does not comply and continues in the protocol, there is no security problem.
Conclusion
The security of our protocol depends on the security of the classical protocol used for anonymous message transfer. The solution considered in this article is the dining cryptographers protocol [1] , however, this solution has a serious drawback excluding it from a number of applications. This problem is that when a disruptor should be detected, the sender S must reveal his identity. This is not explicitly necessary for our solution, however, might be included implicitly by the protocol solving classical anonymous message transfer.
Note that due to no-cloning theorem and properties of authentication of quantum information [9] it is impossible to simply modify the digital pseudosignatures proposed in [5] to work with quantum information. There are two main reasons -from the no-cloning theorem we obtain that we must have a number of identical copies of quantum state if we want to apply digital pseudosignatures. Even more fundamental problem is the result of [9] that any authentication also encrypts the quantum information and therefore other participants have no chance to verify whether two different signatures correspond to the same message.
As a conclusion we remark that it is possible to modify this protocol to realize a different modification of the anonymous message transfer, where the sender is known and the receiver is unknown. It suffices to invert the direction in which the message is being teleported at the end of the protocol.
